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Abstract: Sabah, on the northeastern corner of Borneo, is concurrently Malaysia’s largest

producer of oil palm (Elaeis guineensis) and home to the endangered Bornean elephants (Elephas
maximus borneensis; elephants). Concomitantly, Sabah has been experiencing increasing and
unsustainable human–elephant conflicts (HECs), which have not been thoroughly investigated
from a human dimensions standpoint. To address this void, in March 2019, we conducted semistructured interviews with 37 villagers located in the Sabah districts of Lahad Datu, Tawau, and
Telupid to investigate villager cognitions regarding elephants, behaviors toward elephants, the
formal and informal village institutions employed to mediate HECs, and the future viability of
human–elephant coexistence. Respondents highlighted emotions of fear, anger, and frustration
over crop and property damage that villagers were unable to effectively mitigate employing
traditional institutions and strategies. Although negative emotions were somewhat tempered by
the cultural significance of elephants, respondents indicated that coexistence with elephants
remains challenging and is likely only viable under certain conditions: domestication of elephants,
if elephants no longer destroyed crops, and/or if elephants were provided separate forested
habitat away from humans. Our results demonstrated that elephant conservation in Sabah
is viewed as a “not in my backyard” claim, which can hint at the presence of environmental
injustice. We further examined Sabah HECs using an environmental justice framework and
concluded that HEC as an environmental justice problem requires traditional fixes to be merged
with more extensive, sustainable solutions that improve stakeholder agency.
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In 1982, the state of North Carolina, USA
created a landfill in an economically poor
African-American community to dump PCBcontaminated soil (polychlorinated biphenyl;
McGurty 2009). The resultant civil protests
around the landfill were dubbed “the marriage
of environmentalism with civil rights” (McGurty
2009, 15) and the beginning of the environmental justice movement in the United States, and
ultimately worldwide (Schlosberg and Collins
2014). Bose (2004) stated that viewing environmental problems with an environmental
justice lens involves attending to the ways in
which the human rights–democratic accountability nexus underpins these issues. An array
of social and economic justice sub-movements

are germane, including occupational and public
health and safety and contested Indigenous territories movements (Faber and McCarthy 2003).
More specifically, there is a need to focus on
the existing environmental justice paradigm’s
role in remedying injustices and inequalities
upon marginalized groups via the distribution
of and access to environmental costs and benefits (Taylor 2000, Bose 2004, Schlosberg and
Collins 2014), including human–wildlife conflict
(Schnegg and Kiaka 2018).
Unequal distribution of environmental costs
and benefits is a common point of emphasis
within the environmental justice movement
and associated literature (Schroeder et al. 2008).
Much research has been conducted on the
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Figure 1. The 4 dimensions of the environmental
justice framework based on Pellow (2004).

unequal distribution of costs (e.g., inequalities
related to who bears the burden of hazardous
waste [Rowan and Fridgen 2003], air pollution [Jerrett et al. 2001], and water contamination [Imperial 1999]). However, in a natural
resource management context, the framing
shifts to an unequal distribution of benefits and
consequences (Schroeder et al. 2008).
Researchers have investigated injustices
related to water resource access (Mehta et al.
2014), gold mining revenues (Urkidi and Walter
2011), and bioprospecting (McAfee 1999).
These studies highlight the socially imbalanced
character of policies designed to conserve and
protect natural resources. Similar patterns
arise when using a justice framing of the social
impacts of wildlife conservation. For instance,
the creation of protected areas has been fraught
with cases of environmental injustices toward
locals displaced from or denied access to land
(Cock and Fig 2000, Dahlberg et al. 2010).
Serenari and Peterson (2016) chronicled how
a series of sociopolitical forces catalyzed the
illegal take of wildlife in the United States
in response to societal prejudices. Paloniemi
et al. (2015) found that governance arrangements satisfying special interests generated
injustices related to cost and benefit distribution but also power and knowledge sharing
in Finland, Greece, Poland, and the United
Kingdom. Researchers have also detailed how
markets, specifically certain industries, can
catalyze environmental injustices. For example,
wildlife tourism is prone to injustices because
revenue-sharing and cost-distribution arrange-
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ments favoring those in power often disproportionately harm Indigenous peoples (Schroeder
2008, Schnegg and Kiaka 2018).
Whyte (2010) noted that environmental justice
problems and “not in my backyard” (NIMBY)
claims are often interlinked. The NIMBY claims
are often invoked when people theoretically
approve of an issue (e.g., one’s approval of the
use of wind energy as opposed to fossil fuels) but
reject the terms in which the practice is implemented (e.g., one’s disapproval of wind turbines
installed in their backyard; von Essen and Allen
2020). Researchers have argued NIMBY claims
can serve as indicators of an environmental
injustice because, in situations of social and economic inequality, privileged communities may
have the political and economic resources to successfully convince policymakers to address their
NIMBY claims and shift the burden to an underprivileged community, perpetuating an environmental injustice (Feldman and Turner 2010,
Whyte 2010, Feldman and Turner 2014, von
Essen and Allen 2020). Conversely, those lacking social and economic resources will likely not
have their NIMBY claims deferred. Although
not all NIMBY claims necessarily intersect with
the occurrence of an environmental injustice
in theory (see Whyte 2010), previous research
successfully using NIMBY in a wildlife context
offers precedence (von Essen and Allen 2020) for
applying it in the case of human–wildlife conflicts (HECs).
Like other integrated approaches used to
frame and contextualize socioecological problems (e.g., optimization under constraints;
Wintle et al. 2011), Pellow’s (2004) 4-dimension environmental justice framework (Figure
1) can be used to help situate the data in this
study. The dimensions are not mutually exclusive and interact with each other to produce
inequality. The first dimension highlights the
importance of considering the sociohistorical processes involved in the environmental
inequality, rather than simply viewing it as a
discrete event. The second and third dimensions involve understanding the complex role
of the stakeholders engaged in the situation
and the effect of social inequality on these
stakeholders, specifically being mindful of how
peoples who are lower on the social hierarchy
are more likely to suffer environmental injustices. Finally, agency, which is the power peo-
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ples have to confront inequalities and shape the
outcomes of these conflicts, is required to fully
comprehend a conflict (Pellow 2004). We note
that it is this agency that is called into question
when NIMBY claims are ignored. By analyzing
our results using this framework, we are able to
include the context of social inequality in our
examination and offer an innovative evaluation
of human–elephant conflicts that better reflects
and addresses the environmental injustices
occurring in Sabah.
Researchers have raised justice concerns
over the oil palm (Elaeis guineensis) industry and transnational, monoculture palm
plantations (Fast 2009, McCarthy 2010, Pye
2010, Orsato et al. 2013). Recording these tensions, a report to the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Indigenous Issues detailed
how the rapid palm expansion was facilitated
by the widespread expropriation of land, a
disregard for Indigenous land rights, and discriminatory laws (McCarthy 2010). In addition
to social issues, the oil palm industry has also
been identified as one of the greatest threats
to Southeast Asian biodiversity (Wilcove and
Koh 2010). Once covered in tropical forests, the
industry has rapidly transformed the land to
accommodate oil palm monoculture, shrinking forest-dwelling wildlife populations and
habitats (Wilcove and Koh 2010). In an effort
to resolve both social and ecological concerns
involving the oil palm industry, several proactive sustainable management and certification
schemes took root, with the multi-stakeholder
Roundtable of Sustainable Palm Oil being one
of the most notable. However, criticisms have
been levied regarding the functional efficacy of
these initiatives (McCarthy 2010, Pye 2010), and
grand challenges remain as rural peoples, wildlife, and palm corporations try to coexist.
One of the well-documented burdens associated with palm oil production is increased
human–elephant (Elephas spp., Loxodonta spp.)
conflicts, or the negative interactions of humans
and elephants (Othman et al. 2013, Ponnusamy
et al. 2016, Suba et al. 2017, Othman et al. 2019).
These interactions are increasingly common
across Asia and Africa as populations of humans
grow and continue to convert natural elephant
habitat into human-dominated landscapes (e.g.,
agriculture; Fernando et al. 2005, Kioko et al.
2008). These adverse interactions have led to
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negative attitudes toward elephants and their
conservation (Suba et al. 2017) and appeals
for residents to alter their behavior or develop
ways to mediate HECs (e.g., collective action;
Fernando et al. 2005, Nyirenda et al. 2018).
In addition to impacts to elephants, HECs
threaten elephants and conservation projects
designed to protect them. Human–elephant
conflicts can be a detriment to local residents
directly and indirectly, mainly through crop
and property damage, threats to personal
safety, fear and psychological stress, and
increased workloads (Fernando et al. 2005,
Ogra 2008, Ponnusamy et al. 2016, Suba et al.
2017, Gogoi 2018, Nyirenda et al. 2018, Joshi
and Puri 2019, Saif et al. 2019). The asymmetrical toll on rural livelihoods may lead locals to
develop institutions (formal and informal rules
[Ostrom 1998]) and retaliate against and injure
or anger elephants, and wildlife authorities
may respond by culling problem elephants in
an attempt to reduce conflicts (Kioko et al. 2008,
Othman et al. 2013) but also introducing questions about the future feasibility of human–elephant coexistence in these areas.
We believe that employing an environmental
justice framing in the HEC context will improve
our understandings of the distributional inequities associated with HECs. Reinforcing the use
of an environmental justice framing of HECs
will elucidate the burdens on local people living with elephants as those most impacted by
their protection (see Schnegg and Kiaka 2018)
and present novel ways to conceive of and
design coexistence strategies in monoculture
landscapes and island ecosystems.
To address this need, we employed an environmental justice framing to analyze the historical and present relationship between oil palm
production and HECs in Malaysian Borneo. The
state of Sabah is the largest producer of oil palm
in Malaysia (Othman et al. 2019) and provides
a case study to explore these connections and
implications for people and elephants as well as
other megafauna. To complete our case study,
we interviewed villagers and interpreted their
cognitions (e.g., attitudes, beliefs, norms, values; see Jacobs 2012) toward interactions with
elephants, villager behavior toward elephants,
the formal and informal village institutions
that mediate HECs, and villagers’ views on the
future viability of human–elephant coexistence
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Figure 2. Map of Sabah, Malaysia, and 3 district study areas.

with an environmental justice framework. We
argue that when viewed as an environmental
justice problem, societies require that traditional human–wildlife conflict fixes be merged
with more extensive, sustainable solutions that
address underlying issues and injustices.
The goal of our research was to add knowledge to the underdeveloped human dimensions of HECs in Borneo literature by employing
semi-structured interviews to document local
stakeholder perceptions, cognitions, and behaviors regarding elephants, elephant damage, and
future coexistence with elephants. We used our
results to offer evidence of elephant conservation as a NIMBY claim—a novel conception of
HECs. We used the NIMBY claim as an indicator of a potential unjust governance approach to
HECs, hence justifying our final and broadest
contribution of framing HECs in Sabah within
an environmental justice framework.

Study area

Human–elephant conflicts are occurring
in Sabah, Malaysia on the island of Borneo
(Figure 2), which is home to the majority of the
world’s Bornean elephants (E. maximus borneensis; Othman et al. 2013). Five key Managed
Elephant Ranges (MERs) have been identified within the forests of Sabah, for a total of
1,359,346 ha of habitat (Suba et al. 2017). The 2
largest MERs (the Lower Kinabatangan range
and the central forest of Sabah) are commercial
forests, where logging is ongoing and there is
some conversion to mono-plantations and silviculture activity. The 3 smaller MERs are forest reserves (Ulu Kalumpang Forest Reserve
and Lower Kinabatangan Range) and a wildlife reserve (Tabin Wildlife Reserve), although
these include areas that are fragmented and
encroached upon by oil palm plantations (Suba
et al. 2017). In total, approximately 2,000 indi-
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vidual elephants inhabit these key MERs.
The displacement of elephants in Sabah
from the forest began with timber extraction
(Othman et al. 2013). After decades of declining logging revenue, the Malaysian government and large corporations turned to oil palm
production to maintain revenue for the socioeconomic development of Sabah, including the
261,264-ha Government of Malaysia–United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
project initiated in March 2012 (Othman et al.
2013). Sabah now contributes approximately
10% to global palm oil production and is the
largest producer of palm oil in Malaysia. Land
use change has come at the expense of longrange land use planning, however, negatively
impacting elephants and other native species
(Othman et al. 2013, 2019).
Reduced available habitat threatens the
existence of wild Bornean elephants in Sabah.
Additionally, HECs are increasing particularly
in areas close to MERs and bordering plantations (Othman et al. 2019). With their historical
migration corridors destroyed or obstructed by
human settlement and electric fences erected
to protect the oil palm from elephant damage
(Estes et al. 2012), elephants are increasingly
moving through and relying on private lands
(Othman et al. 2019). Conventional thinking
has not adequately considered severe impacts
to traditional elephant routes and habitat connectivity (Othman et al. 2019), particularly during flooding (Estes et al. 2012). For instance,
electric fences have been erected to safeguard
palm stands of all ages, and there is a false
positive perception of fencing placed around
older palm stands. However, these fences are
not actually preventing elephant damage from
occurring, as elephants prefer trees <5 years of
age (Othman et al. 2013, 2019). Fencing reduces
the land available for elephants to roam, heightening the potential for HECs in nearby communities, those who are least capacitated to prevent HECs (Estes et al. 2012). There is hope for
a land-sharing strategy, however, as forested
lands in Sabah are still highly suitable habitat
for elephants (Alfred et al. 2012).
We chose 3 villages in different districts in
Sabah for our data collection: Kampung Sri
Darun in Lahad Datu, Kampung Iban in Tawau,
and Kampung Imbak in Telupid (Figure 2).
These villages were chosen based on the fre-
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quency of HEC reports received by local wildlife
authorities. We further divided each village into
high conflict, medium conflict, and non-conflict
zones. The heads of the villages helped us identify potential respondents living in each zone.

Methods

Data collection and analysis

We employed a rapid assessment qualitative approach (Beebe 2001) to elicit the broad
range of experiences of smallholder oil palm
producers (Berg 2001). We used selective (key
respondent) sampling (Thompson 1999) and
subsequent referral-based sampling (Biernacki
and Waldorf 1981) to maximize this range
of diverse perspectives in the study area.
Our sampling strategy was not intended to
achieve representativeness; we intentionally
approached individuals with direct knowledge of or experience with HECs. We used
a refined, semi-structured interview guide
tested for a 3-village pilot study to collect data
from respondents (N. Othman, Kinabatangan
Orangutan Conservation Programme, unpublished report). We employed semi-structured
interviews because we sought to answer some
standardized, predetermined questions and to
allow participants to introduce new concepts
or insights that they deemed important (Berg
2001). Questions included respondents’ experience with and knowledge of elephant interactions in their community, how they managed
these interactions and the perceived efficacy
of their management, and their perceptions of
elephant conservation in Sabah (Appendix I;
approved by Texas State University IRB #6716).
To ensure clear and valid interview instruments in respondents’ native Bahasa language,
we used a forward and backward translation
process (Marin and Marin 1991). Researchers
fluent in these languages completed and digitally recorded the interviews with permission
from the respondent.
Translation and transcript services were procured by native Malaysians fluent in Bahasa
and English and checked by members of the
research team to expedite preparation of digital
recordings for analysis. Each author conducted
an independent coding analysis of the interview transcripts to identify emerging themes.
Detailed codes (e.g., “grandmother,” “respect,”
“communicate with elephants,” “gentle,”
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Table 1. Respondent representation by district,
Sabah, Malaysia.
District

Conflict Medium No
Total
conflict conflict

Lahad Datu 8

2

2

12

Tawau

9

2

2

13

Telupid

8

2

2

12

Total

25

6

6

37

“wild,” “aggressive”) were categorized into
broader themes (e.g., “cultural significance,”
“language to describe elephants”). We then
compared codes and themes to ensure consistency as an intercoder reliability check (Berg
2001). Our analysis concluded when new ideas
or concepts were no longer emerging (i.e., theoretical saturation; Fusch and Ness 2015).

Demographics

Results

in the distant past. The destruction of property,
often water tanks (Figure 3), cited by 6 respondents, produced negative attitudes. Seven
respondents mentioned deficient compensation for their material losses.
The state’s hands-off approach to HECs
occurring on private lands was problematic
for those with undiversified livelihood portfolios: “[elephants] frequently come to the village
and eat the crops and I get upset. Oil palm is
the only source of income for our family. If the
elephants are around it’s a huge burden to us.”
Damage-based interactions typically cultivate fear, as 28 out of the 37 participants explicitly noted feeling fearful toward elephants, particularly due to their large size. This sentiment
was expressed even in instances where respondents had never seen elephants. We identified
16 counts of feeling physically threatened by
elephants. Fears included charging elephants
and the potential for family members and pets
inside and outside of homes to be trampled:

We completed 37 interviews with smallholders from March 11–15, 2019 (Table 1). Except
for 1 respondent, we interviewed smallholders
“The elephant does give the villagers trouble.
or their family members who assisted primary
First, it destroys our crops and secondly, they
landowners with land management. Targeted
could break our homes or vehicles because
smallholders exclusively grew oil palm or a mix
they are big. I didn’t go to my garden for
of oil palm and fruit. They typically owned 1–6
almost one month because I am scared. I
ha, with 1 respondent owning 24 ha. The remainhave four dogs and the elephant trampled
ing respondent was a laborer who worked on a
all of them…I cannot sleep at night when the
smallholder’s lands. Twenty-six respondents
elephants were around.”
were male and 11 were female. The average age
of respondents was approximately 50 years old,
To figuratively describe the linkages between
and the average length of time living in the com- fear and HECs, respondents discussed unconmunity was approximately 39 years.
trollable “wild” elephants: “I am worried and
scared. The elephant is wild and dangerous.”
Villager cognitions about human–
Notably, only 3 respondents (all from Telupid)
elephant conflicts
generally described elephants as “aggressive,”
Negative interactions between smallholder although 7 other villagers noted that elephants
stakeholders and elephants and the result- can become aggressive if harassed by people:
ing forced, tenuous coexistence was becoming “they will be aggressive if we disturb them.”
the norm: “[destruction from elephants] is the Conversely, 4 respondents explicitly mentioned
routine of our life.” Respondents described the that elephants do not kill or harm people, but 3 of
detrimental effects of increased elephant pres- these respondents were still scared of elephants.
ence, which was ascribed to habitat loss, often
Negative interactions with elephants driven
attributed to industry.
by fear and destruction led to the majority of
Twenty-four respondents expressed frustra- respondents (n = 24) feeling that elephants did
tion and despair due to routine crop damage not provide any clear personal value and are
(primarily oil palm and bananas [Musa spp.]) considered a burden and detriment to their livefrom elephants (Figure 3). The remaining lihoods. One respondent stated, “the elephants
respondents never experienced damage, rarely have no value. They destroyed all our crops,”
experienced damage, or experienced damage while another asserted, “I don’t think they have
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Figure 3. Oil palm (Elaeis guineensis; left) and water tank (right) damage from elephants
(Elephas maximus borneensis; photos courtesy of N. Othman).

value, the elephants are pests.” However, 9
respondents mentioned the potential for touristic value, although they had not personally
experienced this benefit. Only 2 respondents
expressed that elephants provided a cultural or
intrinsic value: “firstly, the elephants have value
because they are the kings of the forest. Secondly,
they are valuable for tourism. We cannot take the
elephant’s presence for granted.”

Villager perceptions of elephant
presence
Despite many of the negative attitudes toward
elephants and the destruction they can cause,
many respondents did not blame elephants.
Interviews revealed that respondents perceive
HECs to be a relatively new phenomenon caused
by external factors that altered elephant behavior. All 25 respondents from Lahad Datu and
Tawau expressed that HECs are a recent problem. Some respondents offered a range of dates
(e.g., starting in 2015, 2018, “the past few years”),
but most respondents simply compared “before”
to “now” when sharing their recent increases
in interactions with elephants. Respondents in
these districts all agreed that elephants were
once rarely seen because the animals stayed in
the forests and away from villages. Perceptions
from Telupid were mixed (unrelated to our
conflict zone categorization), with about half of
respondents echoing that elephant interactions
have increased over recent years. The other half
noted that elephants were once more visible but

have since left or return seasonally.
Twenty-three of 37 respondents made the
clear causal linkage that elephants enter their
villages because habitat loss has led to elephants
attempting to find food outside of their natural
habitats. For example, 1 respondent stated, “the
main factor is [the elephants’] natural habitats
are now converted to oil palm plantation. When
the forests vanished, there were no more food
resources available for elephants.” Similarly,
another respondent assured, “actually, these
elephants are not trouble-makers; if they have
areas that are able to give them food then they
will not come to our area.” A corollary to this
point, 11 respondents indicated that palm oil or
timber companies are culpable in the displacement of elephants from their original forest
habitats. Some respondents did not prescribe
an explanation, but they generally noted that
elephants were “just trying to survive” and that
people should not “be too hard to the elephants,
they are just animals.” Respondents who articulated the relationship between habitat loss and
increased elephant interactions often expressed
empathy and pity for the animals:
“Elephants are just like us. They want to live,
too. The elephants should not destroy the
crops, but we understand why they do that,
because they need to find food. We do feel
sorry for the elephants, but for certain people it’s difficult because that’s their source of
income to feed their family.”
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1 respondent noted, “we never throw the firecrackers directly at the elephants. We were just
trying to scare the elephants away.” Most of
these respondents attributed this to a desire to
respect or care for elephants: “we don’t have the
heart to hurt the elephants.”

Figure 4. Noise cannon used to drive off elephants
(Elephas maximus borneensis; photo courtesy of
Sabah Wildlife Department).

A few respondents also offered additional
interpretations of increased elephant presence
in their villages. For example, 5 respondents
mentioned that there are “different” kinds of
elephants—either in the context of current elephants being different than past generations of
elephants, or that some elephants are “gentle”
and some are “wild.” Additionally, 1 respondent hypothesized that elephants raid gardens
more often because they are becoming “more
bold because they are familiar with people.”

Mitigation response
To avoid negative interactions, smallholder
respondents use numerous strategies to drive elephants out of their gardens and away from their
homes and villages. Thirty respondents mentioned taking personal action to drive elephants
away. This took the form of scaring elephants
away with light (e.g., fire, torch lights, lamps),
sounds (e.g., noise cannons [Figure 4], firecrackers, beating on water tanks), or smells (e.g., burning tires). Nine respondents from Lahad Datu
and Tawau indicated that they rely on similar
community efforts, where neighbors assist each
other in driving away elephants. Many respondents noted that, at best, these actions created
temporary solutions, although some respondents found particular strategies, such as noise
cannons, tire burning, and firecrackers, ineffective because elephants have become habituated
to these stimuli. Eight respondents expressed an
interest in using electric fences to keep elephants
out of their gardens, but all 8 lamented that the
cost is prohibitive and, therefore, had yet to try
this tool they believed would be effective at mitigating HECs.
Eighteen respondents explicitly stated that
they do not seek to harm elephants when they
take action to drive them away. For example,

Institutions governing human–
elephant interactions
Our research identified 2 formal institutions
playing key roles in determining the responses
deemed appropriate for handling HECs. These
formal institutions linked primary smallholder stakeholders to secondary stakeholders
related to HECs, namely government personnel. First, complaints against elephants are to be
routed through the Sabah Wildlife Department
(SWD). Respondents regularly stated that they
requested assistance from SWD or contacted
their village leader who would contact SWD on
their behalf. However, the legitimacy of this formal institution is questionable. Twelve respondents expressed discontentment with SWD’s
response to HECs, while 6 respondents were
satisfied with how SWD intervened: “we called
the SWD but they ignored our reports…they
came but very late, and when they were here,
they just used their noise cannon here and there,
as if they were playing around.” Second, bans
on killing problematic elephants were effective
deterrents of illicit behavior for the few respondents who mentioned destroying elephants.
Two respondents indicated they do not hurt
elephants because of government protections,
fearing that the Malaysian government will take
action against them if they retaliate.
Seventeen respondents alluded to the cultural importance of elephants, a critical informal
institution deployed in an HEC context, which
restricts smallholders’ perceived agency in handling HECs. Frequently, respondents stated that
elephants needed to be treated with respect and
that they should not be harmed or harassed.
These respondents agreed that one should not
speak poorly of elephants or disturb their dung
because they can sense it and will “give you trouble.” For example, 1 respondent explained, “our
ancestors have a relationship with the elephants.
According to my father, we shouldn’t speak bad
things toward the elephants. We should respect
them.” This was often paired with the belief
that elephants can “read our mind and heart,”
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which was frequently mentioned in the context of respondents politely asking elephants to
leave their villages. Many of these respondents
referred to elephants as “grandmother” out of
respect, with 1 respondent noting that the “elephant is the legacy of our ancestors” and “we
just said with respect, ‘please go, grandmother,’
and the elephants just passed [by] our garden.”
The dissonance between respecting elephants
and the damage they caused proved to be a
frustrating paradox for some respondents. One
respondent alluded to an apparent contradiction in the cultural significance of elephants
and material damage they cause, claiming, “if
they are our grandmother, then they will not
eat or damage our crops.” Other respondents
elaborated on an apparent cultural devaluation of elephants in Telupid, where elephants
used to be “part of our ancestral beliefs, but
now we don’t hold the same beliefs anymore.”
Drawing a finer-grained evolutionary demarcation, another respondent noted that, “before, the
elephants understood what people say, [but] not
like nowadays” because current elephant populations are different from the old ones.

A future living with elephants
Given their negative interactions with elephants, respondents recognized significant
obstacles to coexistence. However, their inability to improve their prescribed, involuntary
roles as elephant conservators suggests limited
agency to modify their situations. There were
mixed responses related to who owns Borneo’s
elephants, which led to differing responses
about who should be responsible for their conservation. Fifteen respondents indicated that
elephants belong to SWD or the government
in general. Accordingly, the Malaysian government is obligated to assist with HEC mitigation:
“we begged, ‘please help us to control the elephants from coming to our land.’ The government must play their role.” Other responses to
ownership included the World Wildlife Fund
for Nature (3), God (3), all villagers present (3),
and no one (2). Despite this, only 7 respondents
specified that SWD is responsible for managing elephants, with an additional 2 respondents
mentioning that someone must take responsibility for them, although they were not sure who,
suggesting they were impotent without someone stepping forward to help: “if there is no one
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who wants to take the responsibility to look after
the elephants, then what should we do?”
Thirty-one respondents stated that elephants
should be protected from harm for a range of reasons. Eight respondents appealed to the intrinsic
value of elephants, stating that it is important
for future generations to see elephants: “it’s our
heritage, for our future generations. We want
our kids to still be able to see the elephants.”
Two respondents indicated that they felt pride
in their elephant populations, saying it would
be “our loss” if they went extinct: “only we have
these animals, and they’re almost extinct, so I
feel sorry for them.” Three Telupid respondents
commented that the material value of elephants
to the tourism industry could be a reason to keep
them around, though a burden to villagers.
Thirteen of these 31 respondents asserted that
elephant conservation should occur in distinct
areas separated from villages (e.g., fenced-off
forests), whereas a few others generally mentioned that they supported conservation efforts
as long as elephants cannot harm people or
crops. For example, “[I agree that elephants
should be protected]…if they stay in the forest,
if they come to the village, they will only cause
trouble,” and “if there are dedicated spaces, and
people to look after them, then maybe we could
keep them from extinction.”
Respondents provided their views on a potential future sharing the landscape with elephants.
Eight respondents said that they would not
be willing to live with wild or destructive elephants, but if elephants would leave crops alone,
sharing the land would be tolerable. For example, 1 respondent stated, “if they don’t destroy
or damage anything then it is also possible to
share the landscape with them.” A respondent
added, “if they don’t bother us then it should
be fine.” Regardless of the positivity of interactions, only 3 respondents indicated that humans
and elephants could “live in harmony.” Many
respondents indicated that they would be open
to sharing land with elephants, but with significant caveats. Nine respondents stated that the
only acceptable future arrangement is separate
forested areas for elephants, away from human
villages: “sharing the land with the elephant is
impossible because we are different. If possible,
we separate them because the elephants damage
the crops.” Five respondents stated that, due to
the “aggressive,” “unpredictable,” and “danger-
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ous” nature of elephants, they do not wish to
live around elephants: “they cannot live with
us because they destroy our land. It is impossible for us to be their friend.” Eight respondents reasoned that “domesticating” or “taming”
elephants would neutralize the dangers posed
by wild elephants to humans or crops and provide value to humans: “if we domesticated them,
then they will follow our instruction. If they don’t
destroy or disturb us, then its ok.” An additional
2 respondents suggested a zoo-like arrangement
where elephants are artificially fed so that they do
not have to eat crops: “maybe if there is food available for the elephants then they will not enter our
village, just like they are given food in the zoo.”
Most respondents considered ways to avoid
mounting tensions, with 31 respondents stating
that they had contemplated switching or would
like to switch crops in an effort to reduce damage from elephants. However, these respondents found it infeasible due to the amount
of time, effort, and money it would require,
with many also adding that changing crops is
fruitless because elephants will destroy anything they plant: “I do think about it, but if
we change the crops the cost is too big. If we
plant the bananas the elephants will still eat
the bananas.” Only 1 respondent said switching crops was not necessary, and 2 respondents
indicated that they may consider changing
crops in the future, but they do not suffer from
enough damages currently.
Many respondents felt that they were at a
loss for actions to take or solutions to help
themselves successfully coexist with elephants.
Twelve respondents explicitly expressed feeling
a lack of control related to elephants and their
coexistence with them. For example, 1 respondent indicated, “if they want to come, no one
can stop them,” and another said, “it’s difficult
because the elephants want what we want, and
it’s hard to control them.” Nine respondents
expressed that they “don’t know what else to
do.” For example, they said, “I don’t know any
other way. If there are any methods, please
share them with us.”
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viewed as a valid marker of injustice (Feldman
and Turner 2010, Whyte 2010, Feldman and
Turner 2014) in a wildlife (von Essen and Allen
2020) and specifically HEC context. Nearly half
of respondents stated that elephant conservation should occur in locations that are separate
from human settlement—not in their backyards. Claims of NIMBY have been recorded
where stakeholders theoretically approve of
megafauna conservation, but not in its practical implementation. For example, Scandinavian
farmers and hunters approve of large carnivore
recovery in principle but appeal to NIMBY in
their attempts to use ecological arguments to
contend that wolves (Canis lupus) have the right
to exist, but only under certain imposed conditions (von Essen and Allen 2020). Respondents
who perceived greater negative socioeconomic
consequences from whale conservation tended
to oppose protection, which is consistent with
a NIMBYism (Hamazaki and Tanno 2002).
Wildlife conservation has long presented these
implementation conflicts, although documentation does not always include the NIMBY
moniker (Gogoi 2018, Schnegg and Kiaka
2018). We argue that the NIMBY claim in Sabah
is not sweeping or absolute but is contingent
upon involved stakeholders finding the right
combination of levers to pull to ensure equitable results. Problematically, injustices have
festered without clear or practical boundaries of responsibility or adequate resources to
deal with HECs. In essence, villagers invoking
NIMBY in the Sabah case is symptomatic of
an unjust approach to managing HECs (i.e., a
pathology of governance). Our contribution to
the pursuit of a socially legitimate coexistence
scheme in Sabah and elsewhere is in highlighting the absence of environmental justice in the
context of HECs.

Human–elephant conflicts as an
environmental injustice

We further analyze our results using Pellow’s
(2004) environmental justice framework
(Figure 1), where we consider how the interacting processes, effects of HECs, and the roles
Discussion
and agency of stakeholders have resulted in
Human–elephant conflicts as a
environmental injustice. It is important to first
NIMBY claim
consider the sociohistorical process and history
Most villagers would prefer to not have ele- of exploitation of smallholders by transnational
phants in their backyards, and NIMBY can be estates alluded to by respondents, resulting
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in a regionally unequal oil palm production
playing field across Sabah and South Asia in
general. Environmental injustices that enabled
the expansion of large-scale, monoculture oil
palm plantations, including the expropriation
of Indigenous land and discriminatory laws,
are well documented (McCarthy 2010). The
sociohistorical process is evolving, playing out
in terms of stakeholder negotiation of HECs
in Sabah. Nearly a third of our respondents
attributed the displacement of elephants and
subsequent increased local human–elephant
interactions to large palm oil or timber companies. Another 60% of respondents were not as
explicit but made clear causal linkages between
large-scale losses of previous elephant habitat
and increased HECs at the village level. These
past injustices resulted in transnational estates
disproportionately benefiting from palm oil
demand and siphoning market share from
smallholders, laying the foundation for the
inequalities explored in this paper. Villagers
are culpable, too, as they have switched from
traditional farming to integrate oil palm into
their livelihood portfolios or sold or transferred
their land to large oil palm companies (Suba et
al. 2017). However, it is important to recognize
that these decisions made by villagers are in the
context of and restricted by their lack of other
income-generating activities, which limits their
economic and political power to address such
environmental injustices and is compounded by
elephant damage they experience. Similar situations where poverty and biodiversity hotspots
coincide often lead to unstable balances in coupled socioecological systems, where a lack of
resources, institutions, and governance result
in people unprepared for long-term natural
resource management (Barrett et al. 2011).
The limited agency of our respondents to
mitigate HECs translates into a lack of control over their own environments, signaling an
environmental justice issue (Arcury et al. 2002).
The HECs in Sabah highlight villagers’ incapacity to cope with HECs under the state’s pro se
quisque approach to HECs. Our findings suggest that imbalanced economic resources first
and foremost produced inequities associated
with elephant damage. With ample resources
at their disposal, industrial oil palm producers
are able to cope with HECs and rural villagers
less so (Estes et al. 2012; Othman et al. 2013,
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2019). The agency, or capacity of stakeholders to modify their situations, plays a significant role in how they have responded to HECs
(Jepson et al. 2011, Nyirenda et al. 2018), aligning HECs with other environmental injustices
(Grineski 2009, Bell and Braun 2010, Lowman
et al. 2013). Financial resources are critical to
stakeholders’ abilities to act on and defer their
own elephant-based NIMBY claims in Sabah,
whereas villagers without sufficient funds cannot handle HECs on their own. Inherently,
deferring 1 group’s NIMBY claim transfers the
effects of inequality onto another group (Whyte
2010). Smallholders attempt to invoke their
own NIMBY claims, but their limited agency
(due to their demonstrated limited economic
and political resources) prevents meaningful
reconciliation to injustices. This relationship
between a lack of agency and inferior, stagnant situations for communities is well documented in the environmental justice literature
(Grineski 2009, Lowman et al. 2013). Moreover,
our results suggest that deferring the problem
is emboldening and habituating elephants and
intensifying injustice. Injustice, described here
as social norm, is not a formula for coexistence.
The formal institutions developed to address
HECs in Sabah are in and of themselves not
enough to mitigate HECs because they suffer
from legitimacy deficits. Formal institutions
enacted by government officials perceived as
indolent, disinterested in citizens’ problems, or
unhelpful are generally unsuccessful at solving
environmental justice problems (Lowman et al.
2013). The literature is replete with evidence
of the importance of institutional legitimacy
to charismatic megafauna conservation, and
legitimacy deficits have been cited as reasons
conservation efforts have struggled (Sandström
and Pellikka 2008, Serenari and Taub 2019). In
Sabah and elsewhere, bans on killing problem
elephants appear ineffective (Nyirenda et al.
2015), and the absence of a universal damage
compensation scheme is simultaneously laudable (Saif et al. 2019) and problematic (Schnegg
and Kiaka 2018). Our results suggest that the
state’s underdeveloped HEC institutions places
villagers in a tenuous position of self-reliance.
This state of affairs is compounded by villagers
who often hold 1-dimensional livelihoods, often
going all in on palm despite the risks. This aspect
of village life in Sabah may explain the desire to
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assign a monetary value to elephants as well as
help explain why villagers are bereft of agency.
In sum, our findings on institutions suggest
that the Sabah Wildlife Department must find
innovative ways to unfetter smallholders from
the perceived burden of living with elephants.
If HEC governance is to be successful and sustainable, smallholders need to find legitimacy in
SWD’s exercises of power (e.g., bans on killing
elephants, self-proclaimed role as an effective
wildlife authority; Stoker 1998).
Informal institutions signaled hope for an
equitable outcome in Sabah through culture,
specifically collective action, shared intrinsic value, respect, empathy, and kinship ties.
Societies have successfully appealed to cultural
elements to coexist with elephants (Gogoi 2018,
Saif et al. 2019). In the sketched principles for
coexistence presented here, respondents appear
to have divulged a role for tradition in mitigating HECs, contrasting previous findings suggesting a diminished role for culture in Malaysia
(Ponnusamy et al. 2016, Othman et al. 2019).
With no attempt to romanticize local environmental histories, we reference tagal, specifically,
a Malay worldview of how to live a balanced
life within the river ecosystem of Sabah and also
appease the spiritual realm. Given that HECs are
a relatively new phenomenon for these villages,
our results suggest that tagal may explain why
tolerance has not run dry for those willing to
see what the future holds. We detect an urgency
to the HEC matter, however, as we provide
evidence that patience is indeed wearing thin.
Our data signaled that informal institutions are
being tested with insinuations of (1) tensions
between tradition and the realities of living with
elephants, (2) divergent values and shifting and
nullified beliefs about the meaning and value of
elephants in rural society, and (3) the processes
of modernity and late-capitalist transformation that are infiltrating rural Malay societies
(Kahn 2001). These shifts in informal institutions
have implications for potential HEC solutions,
particularly desired or proposed compensation schemes. When cultural ties to elephants
are strong, compensation schemes to offset the
monetary costs of damage may not be effective
in improving tolerance toward elephants (Saif
et al. 2019). However, in Sabah, where cultural
bonds may not be as robust, compensation may
prove helpful. Currently, the tense atmosphere
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of human–elephant interactions is unsustainable
given that elephant survival depends on human
tolerance, and increased HECs erode the tenuous cultural values that bolster tolerance in the
area (Suba et al. 2017, Saif et al. 2019).
Symptoms of environmental injustices appear
to be consistent in the qualitative literature,
and the effects of injustice are often reported
as shifts in cognitive well-being—in this case,
placing a heavy burden upon individuals to
involuntarily carry the weight of endangered
species protection. Smallholder cognitions
identified in this study parallel those found in
other instances of environmental injustice, and
such emotional stresses can lead to impacts on
health and quality of life (Lowman et al. 2013).
For instance, frustration, despair, and fear were
commonly voiced among our respondents, akin
to the feelings of fear and psychological trauma
expressed by Appalachian coalfield activists as
a result of the flooding caused by mountaintop
removal (Bell and Braun 2010) or the frustration
and anxiety felt by rural residents neighboring
large farms that apply potentially contaminated sewage sludge to their lands (Lowman
et al. 2013). Documenting smallholders’ experiences in this way gives voice to their experience
so that they may be incorporated into conversations about viable HEC policy alternatives.

Solving human–elephant conflicts in
Borneo and beyond
Utilizing Pellow’s (2004) framework allows
for a more holistic understanding of HECs in
Sabah. Contextualizing HECs within sociohistorical processes and purposefully highlighting
the agency of smallholders generates ideas on
how stakeholders can get involved to promote
coexistence. For example, adaptive capacity
building can improve agency and diminish
feelings of helplessness (Arcury et al. 2002),
such as, at a minimum, providing smallholders with accessible information about how to
handle human–elephant interactions. Evidence
suggests providing information and knowledge can augment self-efficacy and perceptions
of control (Arcury et al. 2002).
Eventually, sufficient levels of other valuable HEC resources will need to be provided
to further increase smallholder self-efficacy
and perceived control. For instance, wildlife
tourism has been recommended as a potential
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fix. Indeed, estates and smallholder communities could cooperatively manage for elephants
by removing fences and embracing tourism,
although future research to ensure viability
is needed (Othman et al. 2019). Smallholders
already recognize the potential touristic value
of elephants, but they do not have a way to
personally harness it. Sabah could adapt and
learn from the community-based models (e.g.,
Schnegg and Kiaka 2018) where both costs (e.g.,
crop damage expenses) could be minimized if
not eliminated, and benefits (e.g., tourism revenue; agency, local capacity, and self-reliance
[Jackson and Wangchuk 2001]) could be maximized. Through self-organization, education,
and empowerment, smallholders in Sabah can
be successful in improving the practices, policies, and conditions that have unfairly impacted
their communities (Bullard and Johnson 2000).
As villages are scattered across a vast monoculture landscape, it is clear that landscapescale land use planning is critical. Oil palm
monoculture landscape presents new challenges for stakeholders and elephants, inviting
HECs (Fernando et al. 2005, Suba et al. 2017).
Although plantations are successfully using
deterrents such as electric fences to minimize
elephant presence, they are subsequently reducing the amount of land available for elephant
populations (Estes et al. 2012; Othman et al.
2013, 2019). With few viable pathways to travel,
elephants move into neighboring smallholder
farmlands where they find temporary suitable
habitat, often leaving damage villagers cannot
afford to experience (Othman et al. 2013, Suba
et al. 2017, Othman et al. 2019). Designing viable agroforest strategies that encourage coexistence (e.g., fencing off only young oil palms;
Othman et al. 2019) and reduce inequities for
rural peoples is vital to mitigating HECs.
Our documentation of HECs in Sabah complements the extensive literature available on
human–elephant interactions in other geographic settings. Negative human–elephant
interactions detailed in our results (e.g., crop
and property damage, threats to personal
safety, and psychological stress) are well documented throughout Asia and Africa (Fernando
et al. 2005, Ogra 2008, Ponnusamy et al. 2016,
Suba et al. 2017, Gogoi 2018, Nyirenda et al.
2018, Joshi and Puri 2019, Saif et al. 2019).
Traditional mitigation strategies, such as using
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fire or banging cans to drive off elephants, were
also reported as generally ineffective (Nyirenda
et al. 2018). Akin to our findings, many communities rely heavily on communal efforts to collectively drive elephants away, which is more
effective than individual efforts (Fernando et
al. 2005, Nyirenda et al. 2018). In locations such
as India (Gogoi 2018) and Bangladesh (Saif et
al. 2019), parallels can be made to our research
regarding the cultural significance of elephants
as a mitigating force against intolerance. Across
these studies, the cultural role of elephants is
also linked to anthropomorphism, prompting feelings of empathy (Gogoi 2018, Saif et
al. 2019). Divergent from these studies, however, our research provides clear links between
HECs and environmental justice.
Our research contributes to ongoing conversations focusing on the vast underlying aspects
of the “human” component of “human–wildlife conflict” (HWC; Messmer 2000). Research
exploring human–wildlife interactions has
evolved from examining HWCs as isolated
events affecting only people’s livelihoods (e.g.,
farming), to delving into how HWCs influence
people’s economic, social, and cultural lives
(Messmer 2000, Hill 2015). As such, mitigation interventions have since included stakeholders’ perspectives, concerns, priorities, and
understandings of HWCs. Indeed, research has
expanded to include ideas such as hidden costs,
which highlight the uncompensated, delayed,
and/or psychosocial harms people experience
from human–wildlife interactions (Ogra 2008,
Doubleday 2020). However, as Hill (2015) notes,
while technical interventions that reduce the
direct impact of wildlife on livelihoods are necessary for short-term resolution, affecting successful, long-term change requires significant
engagement with underlying social issues. By
using an environmental justice lens to examine
HECs (and human–wildlife interactions more
generally), we are compelled to acknowledge
and address the latent, fundamental social problems causing HEC symptoms. We focused on
distributional injustices because of the themes
that emerged from our analysis of the interviews, but future research that incorporates
other aspects of environmental injustices such
as recognition and procedural justice would be
valuable (e.g., Schnegg and Kiaka 2018). Like
many qualitative studies, limitations of our
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research include a small sample size of villagers
ences 108:13907–13912.
and villages. However, we focused on key play- Beebe, J. 2001. Rapid assessment process: an
ers and villages most impacted by HECs. The
introduction. AltaMira Press, Walnut Creek,
results are generalizable to these villages and
California, USA.
should not be used to make inferences for the Bell, S. E., and Y. A. Braun. 2010. Coal, identity,
larger population (Berg 2001).
and the gendering of environmental justice

Conclusion

This exploratory research is the beginning of
a long road to coexistence between smallholders, oil palm producers, and the state of Sabah.
Human–elephant conflicts continue to undermine conservation efforts and prove to be a
constant challenge for coexistence outside of
protected areas. Sabah’s experience is not unlike
HECs in other settings and universal endangered species plights in other parts of the world.
Our documentation of elephant conservation as
a NIMBY claim by smallholders in Sabah serves
as a marker of potential environmental injustice,
which we explored using Pellow’s (2004) environmental justice framework. By framing HECs
as an environmental injustice, we were able to
delve into the social and historical processes at
play, in addition to problematic human–elephant interactions, and recommend potential
solutions that improve stakeholder agency and
their ability to achieve justice.
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Appendix 1. Interview guide consisting of questions about respondents’ experience with and
knowledge of elephant (Elephas maximus borneensis) interactions in their community, how they
managed these interactions and the perceived efficacy of their management, and their perceptions
of elephant conservation in Sabah, Malaysia.
Interview guide
ID:
Location:
Telephone number:
Serial number:
Gender:
Age:
Household members:
Source of income (occupation):
Race:
Length of live/stay in the community:
Education:
Total income:
Interviewed by:
Date:
Q1: Please tell us how you manage your land?
Probe. By yourself? With help?
Q2: Please tell me about your interactions with elephants? Positive? Negative?
Probe. Have you noticed changes in interactions over time?
Q3: What factors do you think influence human interactions with elephants?
Probe. Individual humans, individual elephants, village/community, state, global, ecological,
spiritual, etc.?
Q4: Do elephants pose a threat to you?
Probe. To your family? Livestock? Livelihood? Neighbors?
Q5: Which animals cause the most problems for you? On a scale of 1 to 5, 5 being the worst,
how would you compare elephants as a problem compared to other animals that cause damage?
Q6: Who owns the elephants? (Sabah Wildlife Department, God, etc.?)
Q7: What value do elephants have for you? Why?
Probe. Economic, spiritual, etc.?
Q8: Do you agree that elephants should be protected from extinction?
Q9: How have you responded to the presence of elephants?
Q9(a): Strategies undertaken or rules put in place (formal, informal)?
Q10: How effective have (individual/village/state) responses or rules been?
Probe. Why do you think they are/not effective?
Q11: If you could change what you do to defend your property and family, what would
you change?
Q11(a): Why?
Q11(b): Would you consider changing the crops you grow? Different preventive measures?
Q12: Under what conditions would you consider sharing the landscape with elephants?

